Encryption
How PinkyBond encrypts messages and calls
Everything she shares with you is encrypted on her phone and decrypted on yours. Our server forwards sealed envelopes it cannot open. We never hold the key.
Built on platform cryptography
We did not write our own crypto. On iPhone we use Apple's CryptoKit. On Android we use Google's Tink. Curve25519 key agreement, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM on both, pinned to each other by shared test vectors, so an iPhone and an Android phone produce byte-for-byte identical ciphertext.
Key agreement
Curve25519 (X25519) ECDH
Encryption
AES-256-GCM
Key derivation
HKDF-SHA256
What we do, and what we don't
Every row is checkable. The last three are where we fall short of the best messengers, and we would rather you read that here than find it out later.
| Dimension | PinkyBond |
|---|---|
| Encryption | AES-256-GCM, end-to-end between the two phones |
| Key agreement | Curve25519 (X25519) ECDH, then HKDF-SHA256 |
| Implementation | Apple CryptoKit on iPhone, Google Tink on Android — byte-for-byte interoperable |
| Key storage | iOS Keychain / Android Keystore, hardware-backed where available |
| Pairing | QR code in person, or a 6-character code / link exchanged remotely; both public keys exchanged |
| Verification | A 6-digit code on both phones confirms no one sat in the middle |
| Account | None — no phone number, no email, no password |
| ການເຂົ້າເຖິງເນື້ອຫາຂໍ້ຄວາມ ແລະ ການໂທຂອງເຊີບເວີ | ບໍ່ມີ. ພວກເຮົາບໍ່ເຄີຍຖືກະແຈເລີຍ. |
| What the relay stores | ID ການຈັບຄູ່, ປະເພດຂໍ້ຄວາມ, ໂມງເວລາ, ຂະໜາດ, ຂໍ້ຄວາມທີ່ເຂົ້າລະຫັດໄວ້ — ລຶບອອກທັນທີທີ່ສົ່ງເຖິງ, ຢ່າງຫຼາຍ 30 ວັນ |
| ຮູບ, ວິດີໂອ ແລະ ໄຟລ໌ | ສູງສຸດ 2 GB, ຖືກປິດຜະນຶກດ້ວຍກະແຈໃໝ່ສຳລັບແຕ່ລະໄຟລ໌ ທີ່ມີແຕ່ໂທລະສັບທັງສອງເຄື່ອງຂອງທ່ານເທົ່ານັ້ນທີ່ຖື; ລຶບອອກທັນທີທີ່ດາວໂຫຼດ, ຢ່າງຫຼາຍ 30 ວັນ. ໄປຫາແອັບຂອງຄູ່ທີ່ຍັງບໍ່ໄດ້ອັບເດດ: ສູງສຸດ 25 MB ພາຍໃຕ້ກະແຈການຈັບຄູ່, ເກັບໄວ້ 30 ວັນ |
| ບັນທຶກການໂທ | ໂທລະສັບໃດໂທມາ, ເວລາໃດ, ສຽງ ຫຼື ວິດີໂອ, ຜົນ ແລະ ໄລຍະເວລາ — ເຊີບເວີຂອງພວກເຮົາອ່ານໄດ້, ເກັບໄວ້ 90 ວັນ, ລຶບອອກເມື່ອທ່ານຍົກເລີກການຈັບຄູ່. ບໍ່ມີສຽງ ຫຼື ວິດີໂອຢ່າງແທ້ຈິງ. |
| Push notifications | Carry no text; the phone decrypts locally |
| Safety Mode | Yes — her phone sends neutral substitute data instead of her real status. Your app shows no indicator, though the flag itself is in the snapshot. |
| Forward secrecy | No — one key per pairing |
| Open source | No |
| Independent audit | Not yet |
How pairing works
No phone number. No email. No account. In the same room, she shows a QR code and you scan it. Apart, she sends you a 6-character code or a link. Either way both phones exchange public keys, derive the same secret, and show a 6-digit verification code so the two of you can confirm no one sat in the middle.
She taps “Pair with partner” in PinkyBloom
Her phone generates a Curve25519 key pair (Apple CryptoKit on iPhone, Google Tink on Android)
She shows a QR code, or sends you a 6-character code or link if you are apart
You scan or enter it in PinkyBond, and your phone generates its own key pair
Your public key travels back to her the same way; both phones now hold both public keys
Each phone runs ECDH and HKDF-SHA256 to derive the same shared secret — nothing secret crosses the network
The shared secret is stored in the iOS Keychain or the Android Keystore
A 6-digit verification code appears on both phones; if they match, no one sat in the middle
The Blind Relay
ເຊີບເວີຂອງພວກເຮົາເປັນຄືກັບຕູ້ຈົດໝາຍສຳລັບຊອງທີ່ປິດຜະນຶກໄວ້. ມັນຖືຂໍ້ຄວາມທີ່ເຂົ້າລະຫັດໄວ້ພຽງແຕ່ຈົນກວ່າໂທລະສັບອີກເຄື່ອງຈະມາຮັບ ແລ້ວກໍ່ລຶບມັນອອກ — ຢ່າງຫຼາຍ 30 ວັນ ຖ້າໂທລະສັບນັ້ນຍັງອອບໄລນ໌ຢູ່. ມັນບໍ່ເຄີຍຖືກະແຈເລີຍ. ການແຈ້ງເຕືອນແບບພຸດຊ໌ບໍ່ມີຂໍ້ຄວາມໃດໆ; ໂທລະສັບຖອດລະຫັດຢູ່ໃນເຄື່ອງເອງ.
PinkyBloom
Encrypts on her phone
Blind Relay
ຖືຂໍ້ຄວາມທີ່ເຂົ້າລະຫັດໄວ້ຈົນກວ່າຈະສົ່ງເຖິງ, ຢ່າງຫຼາຍ 30 ວັນ
Cannot decrypt
PinkyBond
Decrypts on your phone
ທຸກສິ່ງທີ່ເຊີບເວີຂອງພວກເຮົາເກັບໄວ້ກ່ຽວກັບຂໍ້ຄວາມ, ໄຟລ໌ ແລະ ການໂທໜຶ່ງ:
pairingId
Identifier for the pairing; not a name, number or email
senderRole
Which app sent it: PinkyBloom or PinkyBond
messageType
ເປັນຊອງແບບໃດ — ຕົວຢ່າງ ຂໍ້ຄວາມແຊັດ, ຮູບຖ່າຍສະຖານະ, ໃບຮັບຮູ້ ຫຼື ການຕັ້ງຄ່າການໂທ — ບໍ່ແມ່ນສິ່ງທີ່ຢູ່ຂ້າງໃນຢ່າງແທ້ຈິງ
timestamp
When it was sent
ciphertext
AES-256-GCM blob we cannot open; its length is the only thing we can measure
retention
ລຶບອອກທັນທີທີ່ໂທລະສັບອີກເຄື່ອງໄດ້ຮັບ; ຢ່າງຫຼາຍ 30 ວັນ ຖ້າມັນຍັງອອບໄລນ໌ຢູ່
relayReceipts
ຫຼັງຈາກສົ່ງເຖິງແລ້ວ, ບັນທຶກທີ່ບໍ່ມີເນື້ອຫາ: ຂໍ້ຄວາມໃດ ແລະ ມັນຖືກສົ່ງເຖິງ ຫຼື ໝົດອາຍຸ. ເກັບໄວ້ 30 ວັນ ເພື່ອໃຫ້ໂທລະສັບຂອງຜູ້ສົ່ງສະແດງ “ບໍ່ໄດ້ສົ່ງເຖິງ”
mediaObjects
ຮູບ, ຂໍ້ຄວາມສຽງ, ວິດີໂອ ແລະ ໄຟລ໌ຂະໜາດເຖິງ 2 GB, ເກັບໄວ້ເປັນຂໍ້ຄວາມທີ່ເຂົ້າລະຫັດຢູ່ Cloudflare R2 ດ້ວຍກະແຈໃໝ່ສຳລັບແຕ່ລະໄຟລ໌ ທີ່ເດີນທາງຢູ່ພາຍໃນຂໍ້ຄວາມທີ່ເຂົ້າລະຫັດເທົ່ານັ້ນ. ລຶບອອກທັນທີທີ່ໂທລະສັບຂອງຄູ່ທ່ານດາວໂຫຼດແລ້ວ; ຢ່າງຫຼາຍ 30 ວັນ
callLog
ໂທລະສັບໃດໃນສອງເຄື່ອງໂທມາ, ເວລາໃດ, ສຽງ ຫຼື ວິດີໂອ, ຮັບສາຍ, ບໍ່ໄດ້ຮັບ ຫຼື ປະຕິເສດ, ແລະ ນານປານໃດ. ເຊີບເວີຂອງພວກເຮົາອ່ານໄດ້ — ນີ້ແມ່ນວິທີທີ່ໂທລະສັບທີ່ດັບຢູ່ຍັງຮູ້ກ່ຽວກັບການໂທທີ່ບໍ່ໄດ້ຮັບ. ເກັບໄວ້ 90 ວັນ, ລຶບອອກເມື່ອທ່ານຍົກເລີກການຈັບຄູ່. ບໍ່ມີສຽງ ຫຼື ວິດີໂອຢ່າງແທ້ຈິງ
Calls
Voice and video are peer-to-peer WebRTC with DTLS-SRTP and fresh keys for every call. The call setup rides the encrypted relay like any message. Before media flows, your phone checks the peer's DTLS fingerprint against a key derived from the pairing secret; a failed check aborts the call.
ເມື່ອເຄືອຂ່າຍປິດກັ້ນເສັ້ນທາງກົງ, ຕົວຖ່າຍທອດຈະສົ່ງຕໍ່ແພັກເກັດທີ່ມັນອ່ານບໍ່ໄດ້. ບໍ່ມີເຊີບເວີມີເດຍໃດໄດ້ຍິນການໂທເລີຍ, ແລະ ບໍ່ມີການໂທໃດຖືກບັນທຶກ. ມັນໃຊ້ໄດ້ລະຫວ່າງ iPhone ກັບ Android. ສິ່ງທີ່ເຊີບເວີຂອງພວກເຮົາເກັບໄວ້ແມ່ນບັນທຶກການໂທ — ໂທລະສັບໃດໂທມາ, ເວລາໃດ, ສຽງ ຫຼື ວິດີໂອ, ຜົນ ແລະ ນານປານໃດ — ເປັນເວລາ 90 ວັນ, ເພື່ອໃຫ້ຄູ່ທີ່ໂທລະສັບດັບຢູ່ຍັງເຫັນການໂທທີ່ບໍ່ໄດ້ຮັບ. ລາຍລະອຽດເພີ່ມເຕີມທີ່ /calls.
Safety Mode
Encryption protects her data from outsiders and from us. Safety Mode is for the case where the person on the other end is the concern. She can pause sharing at any time, and he is never notified. She can also turn on Safety Mode, which substitutes neutral data he cannot distinguish from a real update.
When Safety Mode is active, the partner sees:
Phase
“Follicular”
Mood
“Good”
Energy
3 (Moderate)
The neutral data is encrypted and sent through the normal relay, so it looks the same as a real update in transit and on his screen.
Questions
Encrypted between the two phones. We never hold the key.
No phone number, no email, no account. The same cryptography on iPhone and Android, and a relay that forwards ciphertext it cannot open.
