Encryption
How PinkyBond encrypts messages and calls
Everything she shares with you is encrypted on her phone and decrypted on yours. Our server forwards sealed envelopes it cannot open. We never hold the key.
Built on platform cryptography
We did not write our own crypto. On iPhone we use Apple's CryptoKit. On Android we use Google's Tink. Curve25519 key agreement, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM on both, pinned to each other by shared test vectors, so an iPhone and an Android phone produce byte-for-byte identical ciphertext.
Key agreement
Curve25519 (X25519) ECDH
Encryption
AES-256-GCM
Key derivation
HKDF-SHA256
What we do, and what we don't
Every row is checkable. The last three are where we fall short of the best messengers, and we would rather you read that here than find it out later.
| Dimension | PinkyBond |
|---|---|
| Encryption | AES-256-GCM, end-to-end between the two phones |
| Key agreement | Curve25519 (X25519) ECDH, then HKDF-SHA256 |
| Implementation | Apple CryptoKit on iPhone, Google Tink on Android — byte-for-byte interoperable |
| Key storage | iOS Keychain / Android Keystore, hardware-backed where available |
| Pairing | QR code in person, or a 6-character code / link exchanged remotely; both public keys exchanged |
| Verification | A 6-digit code on both phones confirms no one sat in the middle |
| Account | None — no phone number, no email, no password |
| Servera piekļuve ziņu un zvanu saturam | Nekāda. Mums nekad nav atslēgas. |
| What the relay stores | Pārošanas ID, ziņas tips, laika zīmogs, izmērs, šifrēts teksts — izdzēsts, tiklīdz piegādāts, ne vairāk kā 30 dienas |
| Fotoattēli, video un faili | Līdz 2 GB, aizzīmogots ar jaunu atslēgu katram failam, kas ir tikai jūsu abiem tālruņiem; izdzēsts, tiklīdz lejupielādēts, ne vairāk kā 30 dienas. Partnera lietotnei, kas vēl nav atjaunināta: līdz 25 MB ar pārošanas atslēgu, glabāts 30 dienas |
| Zvanu žurnāls | Kurš tālrunis zvanīja, kad, balss vai video zvans, rezultāts un ilgums — mūsu serveris to var izlasīt, glabāts 90 dienas, izdzēsts, kad atsaistāt pāri. Nekad audio vai video. |
| Push notifications | Carry no text; the phone decrypts locally |
| Safety Mode | Yes — her phone sends neutral substitute data instead of her real status. Your app shows no indicator, though the flag itself is in the snapshot. |
| Forward secrecy | No — one key per pairing |
| Open source | No |
| Independent audit | Not yet |
How pairing works
No phone number. No email. No account. In the same room, she shows a QR code and you scan it. Apart, she sends you a 6-character code or a link. Either way both phones exchange public keys, derive the same secret, and show a 6-digit verification code so the two of you can confirm no one sat in the middle.
She taps “Pair with partner” in PinkyBloom
Her phone generates a Curve25519 key pair (Apple CryptoKit on iPhone, Google Tink on Android)
She shows a QR code, or sends you a 6-character code or link if you are apart
You scan or enter it in PinkyBond, and your phone generates its own key pair
Your public key travels back to her the same way; both phones now hold both public keys
Each phone runs ECDH and HKDF-SHA256 to derive the same shared secret — nothing secret crosses the network
The shared secret is stored in the iOS Keychain or the Android Keystore
A 6-digit verification code appears on both phones; if they match, no one sat in the middle
The Blind Relay
Mūsu serveris ir pastkastīte aizzīmogotām aploksnēm. Tas glabā šifrētu tekstu tikai līdz brīdim, kad otrs tālrunis to paņem, tad to izdzēš — ne vairāk kā pēc 30 dienām, ja tas tālrunis paliek bezsaistē. Tam nekad nav atslēgas. Push paziņojumos nav teksta; tālrunis atšifrē lokāli.
PinkyBloom
Encrypts on her phone
Blind Relay
Glabā šifrētu tekstu līdz piegādei, ne vairāk kā 30 dienas
Cannot decrypt
PinkyBond
Decrypts on your phone
Viss, ko mūsu serveris glabā par ziņu, failu un zvanu:
pairingId
Identifier for the pairing; not a name, number or email
senderRole
Which app sent it: PinkyBloom or PinkyBond
messageType
Kāda veida aploksne tā ir — piemēram, tērzēšanas ziņa, statusa momentuzņēmums, saņemšanas apstiprinājums vai zvana iestatīšana — nekad tas, kas ir iekšā
timestamp
When it was sent
ciphertext
AES-256-GCM blob we cannot open; its length is the only thing we can measure
retention
Izdzēsts, tiklīdz otrs tālrunis to saņem; ne vairāk kā 30 dienas, ja tas paliek bezsaistē
relayReceipts
Pēc piegādes — ieraksts bez satura: kura ziņa tā bija un vai tā tika piegādāta vai zaudēja derīgumu. Glabāts 30 dienas, lai sūtītāja tālrunis varētu rādīt “nav piegādāts”
mediaObjects
Fotoattēli, balss ziņas, video un faili līdz 2 GB, glabāti kā šifrēts teksts pakalpojumā Cloudflare R2 ar jaunu atslēgu katram failam, kas ceļo tikai šifrētās ziņas iekšienē. Izdzēsts, tiklīdz jūsu partnera tālrunis to lejupielādē; ne vairāk kā 30 dienas
callLog
Kurš no diviem tālruņiem zvanīja, kad, balss vai video zvans, atbildēts, palaists garām vai noraidīts, un cik ilgi tas ilga. Mūsu serveris to var izlasīt — tā tālrunis, kas bija izslēgts, uzzina par palaistu garām zvanu. Glabāts 90 dienas, izdzēsts, kad atsaistāt pāri. Nekad audio vai video
Calls
Voice and video are peer-to-peer WebRTC with DTLS-SRTP and fresh keys for every call. The call setup rides the encrypted relay like any message. Before media flows, your phone checks the peer's DTLS fingerprint against a key derived from the pairing secret; a failed check aborts the call.
Kad tīkls bloķē tiešo ceļu, relejs pārsūta paketes, kuras tas nevar izlasīt. Neviens medija serveris nekad nedzird zvanu, un neviens zvans netiek ierakstīts. Tas darbojas starp iPhone un Android. Ko mūsu serveris tomēr saglabā, ir zvanu žurnāls — kurš tālrunis zvanīja, kad, balss vai video zvans, rezultāts un cik ilgi tas ilga — 90 dienas, lai partneris, kura tālrunis bija izslēgts, tomēr redzētu palaisto garām zvanu. Vairāk /calls.
Safety Mode
Encryption protects her data from outsiders and from us. Safety Mode is for the case where the person on the other end is the concern. She can pause sharing at any time, and he is never notified. She can also turn on Safety Mode, which substitutes neutral data he cannot distinguish from a real update.
When Safety Mode is active, the partner sees:
Phase
“Follicular”
Mood
“Good”
Energy
3 (Moderate)
The neutral data is encrypted and sent through the normal relay, so it looks the same as a real update in transit and on his screen.
Questions
Encrypted between the two phones. We never hold the key.
No phone number, no email, no account. The same cryptography on iPhone and Android, and a relay that forwards ciphertext it cannot open.
